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During hostile takeovers of listed corporations, it is necessary to protect the rights 
of shareholders in target corporations, especially those of minority shareholders who 
are in an inferior position. It is both the starting point of regulation on hostile 
takeovers by law and the final goal of justice of law. In this paper, according to 
present situation of listed corporations in China, the author introduces the legislative 
experience of other countries, and analyzes the drawbacks of legislation and reasons 
in our country, and then puts forward some advice to strengthen the regulation for 
acquirers, boards of directors and controlling shareholders of target corporations, 
Meanwhile, he poses the improving measures on protection of the rights of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the goal of protection for rights of minority shareholders can 
be reached. 
In Chapter 1, the concept of hostile takeover is defined and the theoretic bases 
about protection of rights of minority shareholders are analyzed. In Chapter 2, the 
legislations to protect rights of minority shareholders in hostile takeovers in U.K., 
America, the European Union and China are analyzed. In Chapter 3, through 
introducing the cases about information disclosure, the drawbacks of protection for 
rights of minority shareholders are deeply analyzed. In Chapter 4, the author puts 
forward some advice on how to protect them in hostile takeovers. In Subchapter 1, the 
acquirers’ disclosing true information and the improvement of mandatory tender offer 
system are strongly emphasized, and the establishment of system of civil 
compensation is mentioned. In Subchapter 2, it is suggested that fiduciary duty to 
minority shareholders from the boards of directors and the directors’ compensation 
system should be set up. In Subchapter 3, it is advised that fiduciary duty to minority 
shareholders and the system of civil compensation from controlling shareholders 
should be built. In Chapter 4, that the convenient judicial remedy system should be 















forward that the power of Security Supervising and Management Committee of 
exemption of mandatory tender offer should be restricted. 
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二、敌意收购的历史由来                                         
在美国，购买一个公司的股份来控制公司的行为，从 19 世纪中后期就开始
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